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Introduction
The role and effectiveness of women in corporate boards has garnered increased attention. This growing interest stems from the acknowledgment that women have been historically underrepresented in high profile jobs. This is the case of corporate directorships (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Stern, 2006, 2007) , positions in biomedical research (Wenneras and Wold, 1997) , or in leading symphony orchestras (Goldin and Rouse, 2000) .
Recent regulations echo the concern that discrimination may exist in accessing directorships, leading to inefficient utilization of the talent pool. Thus, they recommend increasing the number of female directors in corporate boards. A number of these legislations explicitly argue that gender diversity improves board effectiveness. However, an emerging literature questions the view that female directors behave differently than their male counterparts (see, e.g., Adams and Funk, 2012; Sila et al., 2016) , and asks for further research into the role of women on boards that can disentangle the confounding effect of discrimination.
Consistent with the existence of confounding factors, the evidence linking the presence of female directors with various measures of firm value, risk or performance is generally mixed (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Carter et al., 2003 Carter et al., , 2010 Erhardt et al., 2003; Gul et al., 2011; Rose, 2007; Sila et al. 2016) , with a number of studies indicating that female directors behave differently than their male counterparts particularly in terms of risk-aversion (e.g., Levi et al., 2014) or dividend payout policies (Chen et al. 2017) , and suggesting lower performance in firms with greater board diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009 ). However, the literature studying gender diversity and financial reporting quality systematically reports positive consequences. We contribute to this area by developing and testing alternative explanations for this positive link 2 between accounting quality and women on corporate boards, building on the advances in the recent literature in economics and finance.
The aforementioned prior work in accounting generally argues that differences in behavior across male and female CEOs, CFOs, or directors exist, concluding that females are better monitors than males (Barua et al., 2010; Clatworthy and Peel, 2013; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; Peni and Vahamaa, 2010; Srinidhi et al., 2011) . The support for this prediction comes from different strands of literature that suggest that, in the general population, females differ from males. These strands of literature include behavioral studies (women being more risk averse, less overconfident, and exhibiting more independent thinking), ethics (women being more ethical), and organizational theory (women improving deliberations and promoting communication).
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Against this backdrop, an emerging literature asks the question of whether these differences found in the general population can be extrapolated to leadership positions. Some recent research appears to suggest so. For example, the work of Levi et al. (2010 Levi et al. ( , 2014 suggests that firms with female CEOs and more female directors engage in less aggressive acquisitions, as measured by their lower propensity to initiate acquisition bids, and lower size of the bid premiums, while the work of Faccio et al. (2016) provides evidence that firms managed by female CEOs have less volatile earnings, lower leverage and engage in lower overall corporate risk-taking. In related research, Huang and Kisgen (2013) study financial and investment decisions and conclude that male CEOs undertake more acquisitions and issue more debt than female CEOs, concluding that male CEOs exhibit overconfidence in corporate decision-making relative to female CEOs. In contrast to this literature that suggests gender differences also apply to leadership positions, the early work of Eagly and Johnson (1990) shows that women and men 4 and the presence of female directors. Albeit the literature in this area is scarce, there is prior evidence consistent with gender discrimination in accessing directorships (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Farrel and Hersch, 2005) . For example, Sila et al. (2016) show that female directors are more likely to be appointed if they replace another female, and less likely to be appointed to boards that have a greater pre-existent proportion of females. This is consistent with gender biases (as under no discrimination, these variables should not explain appointments). Consistent but indirect evidence is presented also by studies that systematically report the unexpectedly high number of firms with either no females or with a single female on their boards (see, e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2011) . If better governed firms are less likely to discriminate, and higher quality boards positively influence financial statements quality, 3 gender biases may create a positive association between gender diversity and accounting quality.
Thus, we expect that absent discrimination, there should be no association between gender diversity in corporate boards and accounting quality. Second, we expect that if a gender effect exists, it is driven by discrimination against women. Our predictions are consistent with the previously discussed work that suggests that once the process of female directors' appointment is controlled for, male and female directors behave similarly in leadership roles.
To test our predictions, we use a large UK sample for the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] and study the links between board gender diversity and earnings management. Our analyses yield the following key findings. First, we find that, similar to their male counterparts, the influence of female directors over the monitoring process hinges crucially on whether they are independent.
We find that firms with a larger percentage of women among independent directors show 3 See, e.g., Armstrong et al. (2014) , Beekes et al. (2004) , García Lara et al. (2009 ), Klein (2002 , Peasnell et al. (2005) , and Xie et al. (2003) .
5 improved accounting numbers. We do not find this result in firms with a larger percentage of women among executive directors. In our second set of tests, we separately study discriminating versus non-discriminating firms. In non-discriminating firms, we find that the presence of female independent directors is not associated with better accounting numbers. Consistent with this finding, we also show that financial reporting is of lower quality in discriminating firms. Overall, our evidence supports the predictions that, first, absent discrimination, males and females in leadership roles behave similarly and, second, that discrimination in the access to directorships mediates the relation between female directors and accounting quality. Our results are consistent with Rose (2007) , and particularly, with Sila et al. (2016) and challenge prior work in accounting. In particular, our results suggest that controlling for gender biases in board appointment procedures is important to understand the economic effects of female directors.
We contribute to prior literature by providing new evidence that adds to the increasingly accepted view that women in high profile jobs perform their duties similarly than their male counterparts. We also contribute to the literature by providing a review of how gender biases may impact on the effectiveness of female directors' monitoring that has testable implications for future research. The main implication of our results is that prior evidence of a positive female contribution to board monitoring effectiveness must be interpreted with caution, as it might be driven by discrimination against women in the access to corporate board seats. Our results certainly invite to reconsider some of the prior extant evidence, and are consistent with the work of Eagly and Johnson (1990) , Croson and Gneezy (2009) , Adams and Funk (2012) , Adams and Ragunathan (2015) , and Sila et al. (2016) who show that observed behavioral differences across genders do not apply to high profile positions. 6
Female directors and the monitoring role of the board
Corporate governance encompasses all the processes and mechanisms that guarantee firms are managed in the interests of their stakeholders. The board of directors is at the centre of this decision-making and control system (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Young, 2000) . Next, we discuss the expected association between female directors and accounting quality both in the absence and in the presence of gender biases in the appointment of directors.
Female directors and accounting quality in the absence of discrimination
Against an agency theory backdrop, corporate governance provisions are beneficial if they decrease agency costs. Consequently, one way through which the presence of women directors can contribute to increase firm value is through improvements in the monitoring effectiveness of the board. To study if female directors perform this monitoring role differently than their male counterparts, we focus on the financial reporting system, as it is expected to improve significantly through better monitoring. Directors' influence is predicted to hinge crucially on whether they have (1) sufficient knowledge to understand how managerial decisions influence accounting numbers; and (2) incentives to monitor management (Beekes et al., 2004) .
Characteristics of directors' functional backgrounds, such as financial expertise or tenure can be more intuitively linked to their knowledge and ability to understand how managerial decisions affect accounting numbers and therefore, to the detection of managerial attempts to manage earnings. However, purely demographic attributes such as gender or race are less clearly associated with directors' knowledge, especially regarding the financial reporting system. With respect to the incentives to monitor, these are linked to whether the director is independent.
Independence, as defined in corporate governance codes, is unlikely to systematically differ 7 across genders. 4 Despite this, several recent studies suggest gender diversity on the board may influence a number of firm outcomes (e.g., Levi et al., 2014; Faccio et al., 2016) , including accounting quality . However, consistent with the aforementioned lack of arguments on gender differences in knowledge and incentives, a growing body of research questions that gender differences found in the general population can be extrapolated to leadership positions or to positions in the specialized fields of economics, finance and business (Adams and Funk, 2012; Adams and Ragunathan, 2015; Bugeja et al., 2012; Deaves et al., 2009; Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Gneezy et al., 2009; Sila et al., 2016) .
This discussion leads us to our first prediction. We expect that, if we take as constant directors' skills and knowledge, their decisions related to the financial reporting process will be equal regardless of their gender and only explained by differences in incentives. And thus, absent discrimination, we expect that gender diversity on the board has no impact on accounting quality.
An ample literature shows that independent directors positively influence accounting quality (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2014; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al. 2003) .
Consistent with this literature, if male and female directors behave similarly and there is no discrimination, only the proportion of independent directors (of any gender) should influence accruals quality. 5 However, the process of hiring a new board member is not gender neutral (Farrel and Hersch, 2005) , and prior work suggests that there is discrimination against women, tokenism and stereotyping. As argued by Mateos de Cabo et al. (2011) the effects of female 8 directors cannot be properly measured without controlling for gender biases (discrimination).
Next, we describe how these biases likely impact on board monitoring.
Female directors and accounting quality in the presence of discrimination
Prior work suggests that there are gender biases in the appointment of directors (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Farrel and Hersch, 2005) , and that recruitment processes favor men and are not based only on the grounds of the candidate's skills. Even controlling for experience and education, men have more probabilities of being elected for board membership. Also, there is evidence that women directors are not paid equally for doing the same work (Kulich et al., 2011) , and that they are more likely to be appointed if they substitute another woman (e.g., Sila et al., 2016) . If recruitment processes are gender biased, an association may exist between firms with a larger percentage of women serving on the board and the quality of accounting numbers.
Discrimination may lead to a positive association between the presence of female independent directors and the quality of accounting numbers through at least three channels.
First, biases against women might create a better (larger) pool of available female candidates for directorships, permitting firms that do not discriminate to choose the most talented candidates, who would positively influence accounting quality. Second, given the barriers that women have to overcome to become directors, the ones that succeed could be better prepared and likely to exert greater effort than their male counterparts. This greater effort can be partly explained by higher reputational concerns and being subject to greater scrutiny (Lee and James, 2007) . Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that women directors have better attendance records to board meetings (consistent with women exerting greater effort), and that CEO tenure is shorter in firms with more female directors, which they interpret as underperforming CEOs being removed from their positions quicker in these firms (consistent with increased monitoring by female directors).
Finally and perhaps more likely, the presence of female directors may be a proxy for the quality of the firm governance structure. Better governed firms are likely to have better nomination systems/committees that choose directors according to merit and against objective criteria (e.g., Hutchinson et al., 2015) . If better governed firms provide higher quality accounting numbers (Armstrong et al., 2014) and do not discriminate in the appointment of directors, this would lead to a positive association between the percentage of female independent directors and accounting quality. However, this association would not necessarily imply causality; it would be the result of firms with a larger percentage of female directors having also other governance provisions that improve the financial reporting process. The findings of Chen et al. (2017) support this plausible relevance of corporate governance mechanisms, as they report gender diversity effects only in firms with weak governance.
The alternative view also has some merit, and given discrimination, female directors may in fact be worse monitors if, for example, they have less expertise (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012) or lower incentives to monitor (Westphal and Stern, 2007) . Research on resource dependence and institutional theories shows that board selection procedures are not gender neutral and that firms increase the percentage of female directors to match the demographic characteristics of their employees, in a search for legitimacy or to meet regulators' and societal expectations (Blum et al., 1994; Farrel and Hersch, 2005; Hillman et al., 2007; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011) . Also indicative of this institutional role is that female directors are less influential and are paid less (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004; Bilimoria and Piderit, 2007) . When hiring female directors is an affirmative action and not a search for value, this might lead to inefficient hiring Neumark, 1999, 2000) . For example, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013) show that the introduction of mandated gender quotas on boards can have negative effects on firm value and performance. Thus, ultimately, the effect of discrimination on accounting quality is an empirical question of interest.
Methods and data
Gender biases in the appointment of directors may affect the association between female directors and the quality of monitoring. Overall, we expect that discrimination leads to lower accounting quality. Also, we expect that once we control for the confounding effects of these gender biases, women directors perform their monitoring role similarly than their male counterparts. Next, we describe the tests conducted to understand the links between female directors, gender biases and monitoring (as measured by accounting quality).
Main model (without controls for gender biases)
To test our predictions, we regress a measure of accounting quality (ABS_DAX) on the percentage of women among independent directors and controls. The model is as follows: To better understand whether it is gender that matters, or whether it is the role of the director as independent or executive, we additionally estimate model (1) using three alternative main explanatory variables: a) the % of female independent directors over all directors (independent or executives), b) the % of female directors over all directors, and c) the % of female executive directors over all directors. Our expectation is that, given that only independent directors have incentives to monitor, the presence of female executive directors will not be associated with lower earnings management. To the extent however that females are inherently different (for example, more ethical) and alter board dynamics, the presence of females on the board, irrespective of their role, would impact accounting quality.
Controls include the following corporate governance characteristics: (1) NED, the number of independent directors over the total number of directors; and (2) BSizeDum, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if board size is between 5 and 12 directors, 0 otherwise. Consistent with prior evidence (Armstrong et al., 2014; Klein, 2002) , we expect that firms with a larger percentage of independent directors will present lower absolute discretionary accruals. We also expect that monitoring will suffer in firms with unusually small or large boards (Financial Reporting Council, 2008; Higgs, 2003) , leading to greater earnings management. We also control for the qualifications and networks of board members by including (3) Dir. Qualifications, which controls for directors' skills and knowledge and is defined as the average number of qualifications at undergraduate level and above for all the members of the board; and (4) Dir.
Appointments, which controls for the number of other board seats held by firm directors, and is defined as the mean number of other board appointments of the members of the Board. By including these controls, we ensure that it is not directors' differential skills and abilities that may drive our findings.
We also control for: profitability as measured by firm return-on-assets (ROA), as poor performance is one of the main drivers of manipulation, and, as shown in Kothari et al. (2005) is likely to drive discretionary accruals; Firm size as measured by Total Assets (a proxy for political pressures, which are expected to be greater for large, more visible firms as argued in Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) ; the market-to-book ratio (MTB), as Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that growth firms have additional incentives to conceal poor performance, and McNichols (2000) argue that one should control for growth in discretionary accruals model to capture actual discretionary behavior; Loss_Dummy, a dummy variable identifying firms with losses, as prior work, starting with Beaver (1966) , shows that firms in distress manipulate accounting reports, and also detecting earnings management for firms with losses, especially if they are close to financial distress (Beneish, 1997) can be more complicated; SmallProfit, a dummy variable identifying firms with very small profits (less than one per cent of total assets), which is a potential sign of earnings manipulation, as shown by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Hansen (2010) ; and the dividend pay-out ratio (dividend policies also create pressures for accounting manipulation, as shown by Daniel et al., 2008) . Finally, we incorporate year dummies (Year).
Analysis of firms that do not discriminate in the access to directorships
As we describe at length in Section 2, we expect that the association between accounting quality and gender board diversity is influenced by the existence of discrimination against current and future female directors. To study the effect of gender biases we proceed as follows. We use three 13 simple strategies to identify firms that do not discriminate against women in the access to board seats. With these strategies, we create three sub-samples (I, II and III) where we expect gender biases to be less pronounced. Absent gender biases, male and female directors are chosen based on merit and therefore, they are expected to be similar in their knowledge and incentives, and thus, to behave similarly. Using these samples, we can test in a cleaner setting whether, absent discrimination, female directors behave differently than male directors.
The first identification strategy that we use is naïve, in the sense that we identify as nondiscriminating all firms that have a female director at least once during our sample period (discriminating firms are then those firms that never have a female director throughout the entire sample period). This means that within the subsample of non-discriminating firms we have a number of firms for which in some years they have female directors, and in some years they have not. We label this identification strategy as sample I, and it is our least restrictive strategy. As a second naïve strategy, we follow a similar approach, but applied at the firm-year level instead of at the firm level, and identify as non-discriminating firm-year observations with at least one female director. This strategy is labeled as sample II and means that a single firm could be classified as discriminating in some years (when the firm has no female directors) and as nondiscriminating in other years (when the firm has female directors.)
Admittedly, strategies I and II could be misclassifying some firms that discriminate (and for example, incur in tokenism) as non-discriminating. We address this concern with our third strategy, and also, in additional tests where we focus on cases where the firm has only one female director on the board. In our final identification strategy, we model the decision to appoint women directors to obtain an ex-ante probability of female presence on the board, which we can then compare to actual female presence. To build our model we follow Blum et al.
14 (1994), Hillman et al. (2007) and Srinidhi et al. (2011) , who find that the main organizational predictors of women on corporate boards are firm and board size as well as industry membership. Hillman et al. (2007) follow the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
where Women is a dummy variable that takes value one if there is at least one woman (independent or executive) on the board of directors and zero otherwise, FirmSize is the natural logarithm of market capitalization, BoardSize is the number of directors on the board (larger boards are more likely to include women), 6 FemaleEmployment is the percentage of female employees in each industry/year, as reported by the UK Statistics Authority, Reg is a dummy variable identifying regulated industries, which are more likely to include women for political/visibility issues. Following Hillman et al. (2007) we include as additional control variables: (i) a proxy for organizational age, (ii) the market-to-book ratio, (iii) accounting and non-accounting based proxies for performance (ROA and the market rate of return), as the literature on 'the glass cliff' shows that less profitable firms are more likely to hire females for their management teams (Haslam and Ryan, 2008; Haslam, 2005, 2007) , (iv) the industry concentration ratio, and (v) dummy variables to account for year effects.
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Using model (2) we estimate the firm-year probability of female board presence. In our third identification strategy, we consider non-discriminating observations those with at least one woman sitting on the board and also those observations without female directors but with a low probability of having women on the board given their characteristics. This means that some firmyear observations without female directors are classified as non-discriminating in sample III. 
Accruals quality proxy
We use a widely accepted and extensively used measure of earnings management (the absolute value of discretionary accruals), as a proxy for accounting quality. We use accruals models to estimate discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (2010: 351) argue that the 'use of these models has become the accepted methodology in accounting to capture discretion.' These models assume that the normal level of accruals for a given firm is determined by changes in the operational activities of the firm (changes in sales, which will lead to different levels of basic working capital accruals such as accounts payables or receivables), and by the level of property, plant and equipment needed to carry out the operations (that will lead to a certain level of long term accruals such as depreciation). Lower absolute values of discretionary accruals indicate a more transparent financial reporting system and more useful accounting numbers for stakeholders.
We define discretionary accruals (DAX) as the prediction error of the modified Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) . We calculate DAX using a two-stage approach.
First, we use the standard Jones (1991) model as applied in cross-section to total accruals (TACC). We measure TACC as the change in non-cash working capital plus depreciation and amortization. We then regress TACC on the change in sales, and gross property, plant and equipment for each NACE2 2-digit industry-year, using all available data, but imposing the restriction of at least six observations per industry-year combination. The model is as follows: 
where TA is total assets, ΔREV is change in total sales and PPE is gross property plant and equipment. In the second stage, we use the industry-year ordinary least square parameter estimates from equation (3) to partition TACC into discretionary (DAX) and non-discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are the predicted part of TACC, while DAX are the residuals resulting from this regression. Hence, for each firm j, we calculate DAX as follows: 
where,,    are the fitted coefficients from equation (3) and ΔAR is the change in accounts receivable. We use the absolute value of DAX (ABS_DAX) as our measure of earnings quality.
Larger values of ABS_DAX indicate poorer earnings quality. Our inferences are also identical if we subtract change in receivables from the first stage and use those coefficients in model (4).
As discussed by Armstrong et al. (2010) , Dechow et al. (2010) and Owens et al. (2016) one common concern with accruals models is that if there are intra-industry differences in the accruals generating process, Jones-type models may classify these differences (driven by firmspecific fundamental) as discretionary accruals, inflating the probability of finding cases of earnings management. To control for this possible measurement error, we include in Model (1) a wide set of explanatory variables that are expected to capture these intra-industry differences in economic fundamentals.
Sample and data
We collect data on board of directors' characteristics of UK firms for the period 2003-2012 from BoardEx. The UK is an Anglo-American country with a business environment comparable to the US in terms of investor protection, legal tradition, and quality of accounting numbers (Leuz et al., 2003) , although differences exist with respect to the depth of capital markets and also, liability exposure (Khurana and Raman, 2004) . The UK provides an interesting setting for our tests, as it has a rich corporate governance tradition. Indeed, the Cadbury Report of 1992 is one of the earliest corporate governance codes issued in the world, and the first UK corporate governance regulation recommending an increase in the number of women directors is the Higgs (2003) report, issued over a decade later and marking the beginning of our sample.
We merge these data with BvD Osiris accounting and stock prices information. We remove the top and bottom percentile of market returns, earnings, accruals and discretionary accruals.
This leads to a final sample of 4,785 firm-year observations. This is a large fraction of the non-financial firms listed in the main market of the London Stock Exchange. Our sample is substantially larger and includes smaller companies than prior work on corporate governance characteristics of UK firms, which constrains the sample to FTSE 100 firms (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Ryan and Haslam, 2005; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004) or to firms with December fiscalyear ends (Beekes et al., 2004) .
Insert Table 1 about here   Table 1 Panel A contains sample descriptive statistics. The average percentage of women sitting on boards is as low as 5.8%, while the median at three decimal digits is zero. The percentage of women among independent directors is also very low (5.6%, and the median is also zero).
9 Table 1 Panel B shows that a significant proportion of firms have at least one female director, and this percentage has been increasing over time as depicted in Table 1 Panel B (from a minimum of 28% in 2004 to a maximum of 38% in 2012). These results are in line with previous research that also denounces the high degree of homogeneity in UK corporate elites (Conyon and Mallin 1997; Brammer et al., 2007) . This also confirms that firm size appears to be an important determinant of the female presence on boards, as Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) , who focus on the FTSE 100 firms, find that 61% of their sample firms had at least one woman on their boards. An important and interesting differential feature of our UK sample is that, while in prior US work (see, e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2011) women directors are almost all independent, in our sample, 37% of female directors are executives. That only 63% of women directors are independent in the UK (versus 95% in the US) indicates that both recruitment processes and the role played by female directors in the UK and in the US seems to be different. It also allows us to examine the different links with the quality of the financial reporting system of female independent directors versus female executive directors, a novel analysis in this literature.
The average percentage of non-executive directors is 53%, and the average number of directors is 6.6, also in line with previous work on UK boards (Peasnell et al., 2005) . Accruals are on average negative, capturing the effect of depreciation and amortization, consistent with prior research. Finally, the mean absolute discretionary accruals represent an 8% of total assets, which is in line with prior research (for example, 7.7% in Klein, 2002) . Table 2 contains the correlation matrix. We find a significantly negative correlation between discretionary accruals and the percentage of non-executive directors. We also observe a significant negative correlation between ABS_DAX and: (1) the percentage of independent female directors among total board members (Fem_in_board), and (2) the percentage of women among independent directors (Fem_in_NED). Also, as predicted, Fem_in_board and
Main results
Fem_in_NED are positively associated with Size and BoardSize, indicating that larger firms and firms with larger boards are more likely to include female directors in their boardrooms.
Insert Table 2 about here
In our first set of tests, we analyze the relation between earnings management and the percentage of women among independent directors, without considering the moderating effects of discrimination. This replicates much of the prior research in accounting. Table 3 , column (a),
contains the results of the estimation of model (1). The coefficient on Fem_in_NED is negative and significant (coeff=-0.019, t-stat= -1.80). As a robustness check, we also look at the 20 association between female independent directors over all directors and accounting quality. We also find a negative and significant relation (see Column (b), where coeff= -0.039, t-stat= -2.20).
To fully understand the links between gender diversity and accounting quality, in Table 3 we When we analyze the relation between the percentage of women on the board and earnings quality, without considering whether these women are executive or independent, we fail to find any relation (Column (c)). Similarly, when we consider only the presence of female executive directors, we do not find any effect on earnings quality (Column (d)). This is consistent with only independent directors having incentives to monitor senior managers, and suggests that controlling for the role of directors is important in gender-based studies of female presence on boards of directors. This evidence also suggests that female directors are not inherently different from their male counterparts and that when given the same job, they behave similarly.
Insert Table 3 about here Regarding the control variables, we find a significantly negative relation between ABS_DAX and the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board (NED). This is consistent with prior evidence showing that independent directors improve the quality of 21 earnings. We also find negative coefficients on BSizeDum and on Dir.Qualifications consistent with firms with too large or too small boards or with less qualified directors managing earnings more pronouncedly. This is in line with the recommendations in most governance codes and with the views in the academic literature (e.g., Jensen, 1993) .
In our second set of tests, we consider the role of gender discrimination. To do so, we replicate the main test (Table 3 , Column (a)), but using three sub-samples of firms for which we do not expect discrimination against women in the access to directorships. We do not expect to find an association between female directors and accounting quality for these subsets of firms.
To create the subsamples of non-discriminating firms, we use the previously explained strategies. Strategy I and II are straightforward to implement, as we identify as nondiscriminating those firms that have a female at least in one year during the sample period (sample I); and then, as those firm-year observations when there is a female director on the board (sample II). For our strategy III, we estimate model (2), a logit model where the presence of at least one female director is regressed on firm and board size, whether the firm operates in an industry where most employees are women, and controls. According to Hillman et al. (2007) these three characteristics are the main determinants of the presence of women on boards. 10 The results from estimating model (2) are presented in Table 4 . As expected, firm size, board size and female employment have odds ratios above one (1.15, 1.27 and 23.99, respectively), and the coefficients are significant. Regarding the control variables, it is interesting to note that the coefficient on market return is significantly negative. This is consistent with the 'glass cliff' 10 We acknowledge there might be other characteristics of top management team composition and dynamics that we do not consider in our study and that could be important to understand board composition. This is an important avenue for future research, which should link the literature on corporate governance and accounting with the literature on top management team composition and team work at the upper echelons of organizations. For reviews of these streams of literature see Carpenter et al. (2004) , Forbes and Milliken (1999) , and Joshi and Roh (2009). phenomenon (Haslam and Ryan, 2008; Haslam, 2005, 2007) , whereby women have a greater probability to be appointed to relevant positions in poorly performing firms. The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of any of the variables. In addition, and given the large number of explanatory variables, we ran OLS regressions to calculate variance inflation factors to be certain that results are not affected by multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors are always smaller than 4. Prior research suggests that values below 10 discard multicollinearity problems.
Insert Table 4 about here Next, we turn to the analyses of our three subsamples. Panel A of Table 5 contains descriptive statistics for the variable Fem_in_NED as well as for other key board characteristics, by sub-sample. For sample I (II), we identify 2,225 (1,552) non-discriminating firm-year observations, which account for 46% (32%) of our total sample. There is wide cross-sectional variation in Fem_in_NED, and even for these non-discriminating firms, the percentage of women among independent directors is quite low. We present, by subsample, a test of the differences in average board characteristics. As can be seen, systematically, firms considered as nondiscriminating (Non-Discr) have higher quality corporate governance than firms considered as discriminating (Discr). In particular, discriminating firms have lower board independence, a lower number of highly qualified directors, and directors on their boards are appointed to a lower number of additional board seats. They also have, by construction, lower gender diversity.
Indeed, Fem_in_NED is zero in the discriminating samples, indicating the absence of independent female director in those firms. Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here Panel C of Table 5 contains the estimation of model (1) for the three sub-samples of nondiscriminating observations. In all three cases, the coefficient on Fem_in_NED is not significant at conventional levels (coeff= -0.002, t-stat= -0.14; coeff= -0.015, t-stat= -1.03 and coeff= -0.018, t-stat= -1.30, for sample I, II and III). It is noteworthy that the coefficient of the percentage of independent directors (NED) is negative and significant in all three cases, as expected. However, this coefficient is not significant for the discriminating samples, which are also presented in Table 5 , for full comparability. This is consistent with the descriptive evidence that already suggested that differences exist between discriminating and non-discriminating firms, and also, that our simple identification strategies split sample firms along important corporate governance characteristics and effects, suggesting that gender biases may indeed have important effects in the association between governance and accounting quality.
In our final analysis, we focus on the non-discriminating samples and replicate the results of Table 5 Panel C using Fem_perct as our independent variable of interest. This is consistent with prior accounting research that does not consider the different roles of female directors (e.g., Srinidhi et al. 2011) . To the extent that overall female presence improves monitoring, the effects of using this proxy could be stronger than the ones obtained for Fem_in_NED. The results from this test are presented in Table 6 . Fem_perct is not significant in any of the three subsamples, while NED remains negative and significant. The evidence reported in Tables 5 and 6 questions the findings in prior research, as once the focus is on non-discriminating firms, the association between female directors and accounting quality disappears. Our evidence is consistent with the work of Sila et al. (2016) who also fails to find evidence of female presence being associated with risk-taking, once they implement related strategies to account for endogeneity concerns.
Overall, the results are consistent with the positive association between firms with greater female presence and accounting quality being driven by discrimination against women in the access to corporate board seats. The results are also consistent with our expectation that better governed firms provide better quality accounting numbers and also hire more women directors.
Finally, they are also consistent with female directors, per se, not exerting better monitoring over the financial reporting process, in line with the work of Eagly and Johnson (1990) , Croson and
Gneezy (2009), Gneezy et al. (2009) and Adams and Funk (2012) who argue that observed behavioral differences across genders do not apply to high profile positions.
Gender biases and earnings quality
In our first test we show a positive association between the presence of independent female directors and earnings quality (as shown in Table 3 ). We interpret this as evidence of discrimination because this association disappears once we focus on non-discriminating subsamples (Tables 5 and 6 ). To further substantiate this claim, we look directly at the potential negative consequences of gender biases. In particular, we identify two settings where biases are likely present: 1) situations of obvious gender discrimination, where firms have no women on the board while having a high ex-ante probability of having female directors; and 2) situations where tokenism is likely to take place, where firms have exactly one female on the board while having a low ex-ante probability of having female directors. If gender biases lead to sub-optimal appointments, higher levels of earnings management would be expected for these firms.
To capture gender biases, we first define GenderBias_Disc, which takes the value of 1 if the firm does not have a female director, but it has an extremely high probability of having female directors (above percentile 95); zero otherwise. GenderBias_Disc captures situations in which a firm would be predicted to have female directors, but none are present, potentially signaling the existence of gender biases in the appointment of directors. We use model (2) to predict the probability of female board presence. Second, we look at a different gender biasrelated problem: potential tokenism. Tokens can be defined as groups that, within a given organization, are underrepresented (Kanter, 1977) . Even with the increase in the number of women in top executive positions in the last decades, relatively recent research still considers women managers as tokens (Daily et al., 1999) . To study this issue, we focus on the set of firms that have at least one female director (by construction, firms without women directors cannot suffer this problem). As noted in Adams and Ferreira (2009, p. 291 ) the presence of only one female director is usually regarded as evidence of tokenism. We create GenderBias_Tokenism, which takes the value of 1 if the firm has only one female director on the board and a low probability of having a female director; zero otherwise. The intuition behind this proxy is that in firms with a low probability of having female directors and with exactly one female director, this female director could be a token director.
Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here The results from the first analysis, for the full sample, are presented in Table 7 . Consistent with our expectations, we find a positive and significant coefficient on GenderBias_Disc (coeff=0.056, t-stat=1.89), indicating that gender discrimination is associated with greater earnings management, and thus, lower earnings quality. The results from our second analysis are presented in Table 8 . We define GenderBias_Tokenism using two different thresholds: when the probability of having a female director is in the lowest quartile of the distribution (GenderBias_Tokenism25) and when the probability of having a female director is below the median (GenderBias_Tokenism50). We find a positive and significant GenderBias_Tokenism in both cases, indicating that; overall, gender discrimination is associated with greater earnings management. Across all model specifications, we still find a negative and significant coefficient on NED, consistent with the prior findings and theory. Overall, the evidence reported in Tables 7 and 8 supports our predictions and is consistent with discrimination in board selection processes potentially leading to sub-optimal monitoring.
Robustness tests

Heckman (1979) two stage approach
As a robustness check, we implement a Heckman (1979) two stage approach where we first model the decision to hire a woman director, and then, estimate the relation between ABS_DAX and Fem_in_NED. After controlling in the first stage for the determinants of the appointment of female directors, we expect that, in the second stage, we will not find a relation between ABS_DAX and Fem_in_NED. To model the decision to appoint women directors we use model (2). In the second stage we introduce the inverse of the Mills ratio obtained from model (2) into model (1). Among the explanatory variables in the first stage we include the overall percentage of female employees at all levels of the organization. This variable is expected to affect the hiring of female directors (Hillman et al., 2007) , and is excluded from the second stage, as it is not expected to affect the dependent variable in the second stage (discretionary accruals). This exclusion restriction is the one followed by Srinidhi et al. (2011) , who also implement this approach to control for endogeneity. The results of the second stage are in line with our previous tests, in that female directors play no different role than male directors in monitoring the financial reporting process. The coefficient on Fem_in_NED is not significant at conventional levels (coeff=-0.013, z-stat= -1.14). The coefficient on the inverse of the Mills' ratio is significant (coeff= 0.024, z-stat= 4.02). This is consistent with our theoretical development.
Regarding the rest of controls, the results are in line with those reported in Table 3 . In particular, the percentage of independent directors is, as expected, significantly negative (coeff=-0.027, zstat=-1.79), return on assets is negative and significant (coeff=-0.100, z-stat=-5.35) and the market to book ratio is positive and significant (coeff=0. 005, z-stat=3.30) . Regarding the results from the first stage, they are extremely similar to those reported in Table 4 . 
Alternative sample
In our main tests the sample starts in 2003. This is the year of issuance of the Higgs (2003) report. We do not believe that the Higgs report is a strong affirmative policy. However, we cannot discard completely that it led to the hiring of inexperienced or inadequate women to board positions. This was the case of the Norwegian law on gender quotas for directors, a very strong affirmative policy, that as shown by Ahern and Dittmar (2012) led to suboptimal hiring.
The hiring of inexperienced women to boards of directors could be a contributing factor leading to our findings of no effect of women over the quality of accounting numbers. If this was the case in the UK, it would not be clear whether our findings would also hold in an institutional framework without affirmative actions. Given this, and as a robustness test, we replicate our 28 main findings using a sample prior to the issuance of the Higgs report. In particular, we focus on the period 1997-2002. For this period, we follow exactly the same data collection processes as in our main tests, but with the particularity that we use information on board characteristics from the Manifest database, and financial statements information from DataStream. 12 This alternative sample contains 2,411 firm-year observations. The average number of yearly observations is in line with that of the main sample, and the descriptive statistics are, for most of the variables considered, remarkably similar, albeit the average percentage of females on boards is lower during that period, at 18%. Using this new sample, in unreported tests, we are able to replicate all of the main results, and inferences are not altered. The only difference with the main results is that, given that the new sample is almost half of the one that we use in the main tests, the subsamples in Table 5 are quite small (around 500 observations) and the significance levels of some of the control variables are substantially reduced. Finally, we also obtain very similar results when using the Heckman (1979) two stage approach.
Summary and conclusions
We examine whether female directors improve the monitoring role of the board over the financial reporting system. In particular, we study whether a larger percentage of women among independent directors contributes to improving the quality of accounting numbers, and whether this relation is moderated by gender discrimination in the access to corporate board seats. We build our work against the background of recent research that suggests that gender differences in performance that are present in the general population do not exist in high profile jobs (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Gneezy et al., 2009; Adams and Funk, 2012; Sila et al., 2016) . If males and 12 We use Manifest because of constraints in the access to the data in these early years in BoardEx.
29 females behave similarly in high profile jobs, under no discrimination, the presence of women should have no effect over the monitoring exerted by corporate boards. However, prior evidence suggests that discrimination exists, and thus, we hypothesize that biases in the procedures leading to directors' nomination and appointment can affect the association between the presence of female directors and accounting quality.
Using a large sample of UK quoted companies, we show that the influence of female directors over the monitoring of the financial reporting process hinges crucially on whether they are independent. We show that the presence of executive women directors on the board of directors is not significantly associated with better quality accounting numbers, while the presence of independent women directors is. In a second set of tests, we use several simple strategies to control for the effects of gender biases in the access to board seats and fail to find evidence consistent with larger percentages of women among independent directors being significantly associated with improved accounting numbers. These results are consistent with the view that gender differences in preferences do not apply to women in top management positions. This is consistent with Sila et al. (2016) , who study firm risk-taking and also fail to find evidence that female directors behave differently than male directors once endogeneity concerns are properly dealt with. Overall, the presence of independent directors appears to be the key characteristic to ameliorate the financial reporting process, regardless of gender.
While our evidence does not speak directly to the recent regulatory emphasis on imposing gender quotas, it suggests gender discrimination is correlated with worse firm outcomes, as measured by greater earnings management. It is certainly an important avenue for future research to provide further evidence on what diversity mixes most benefit firms and the economy overall. Ret is the rate of return over the fiscal year. Tacc is total accruals deflated by lagged total assets. We calculate total accruals as Δ(CA-CASH)-Δ(CL-STDEBT)-(DA), where CA is total current assets, CASH is total cash and equivalents, CL is total current liabilities, STDEBT is total short term debt, DA is total depreciation, amortization and depletion. Abs_DAX is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995) , as applied to total accruals. Ned is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. BoardSize is the size of the board of directors. Dir. Qualifications is the average number of qualifications at undergraduate level and above for all the directors. Dir. Appointments is the average number of companies that a director serves. Fem_percent is the percentage of women on the board. Fem_in_board is the percentage of women independent directors among the total number of directors. Fem_ex_board is the percentage of women executive directors among the total number of directors. Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women among independent directors. Total assets is total assets, the market to book ratio is the market capitalization of the firm divided by total assets. Loss_Dummy is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reported a loss in the current year, and zero otherwise. Small_Profit is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports very small profits (less than one percent of total assets). Female employment is the % of female employees in a given industry over the total number of employees in the industry, as reported by United Kingdom Statistics Authority. Firm age is the number of years since the firm's IPO. The concentration ratio is firm sales divided by total sales of the whole industry where the firm operates. We take industries at the NACE2 two-digits level.
TABLE 2
Correlation Matrix Table 1 . Bold numbers indicate significance at the 10% level or better. Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women among independent directors. Controls include profitability (ROA), size (total assets), the market to book ratio, a dummy variable identifying firms with losses (Loss_Dummy), a dummy variable identifying firms with very small profits (less than one percent of total assets) (Small_Profits), the dividend pay-out ratio (Div_Payout), the average number of board members' qualifications (Dir. Qualifications) and other board appointments (Dir. Appointments) and year dummies. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Regulated is whether the firm pertains to a regulated industry. Firm age is the age of the firm measured from the IPO date. The market to book ratio is the market capitalization of the firm divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets. Market return is the rate of return of the firm over the fiscal year. Concentration ratio is firm sales divided by the total sales of the whole industry where the firm operates. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. et al. 1995) , as applied to total accruals. NED is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. GenderBias_Disc is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has a high probability of hiring a female-probability above the 95 th percentile-and has no women on the board. BSizeDum is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the board size is between 5 and 12 members. Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women among independent directors. Controls include the average number of board members' qualifications (Dir. Qualifications) and other board appointments (Dir. Appointments), profitability (ROA), size (total assets), the market to book ratio, a dummy variable identifying firms with losses (Loss_Dummy), a dummy variable identifying firms with very small profits (less than one percent of total assets) (Small_Profits), the dividend pay-out ratio (Div_Payout), and year dummies. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
